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INTRODUCTION  
he modern world is characterized by an unprecedented  
amount of contact among sovereign states.  “Growth in 
international activity and dramatic technological changes have 
greatly increased the frequency with which national legal sys-
tems must interact.”1  This intensified interaction has, in turn, 
resulted in a surge in disputes involving various aspects of pri-
vate international law.2   
Copyright law is an area of private law which easily assumes 
this kind of international character3 because its subject matter 
effortlessly crosses geographical borders.4  This trait has been 
augmented by the development of the Internet and communica-
tion technologies.5  Scholars point out several important factors 
contributing to the ever-increasing importance of copyright law 
in the international arena.  First, technological development 
allows a user easy worldwide access to copyrighted works to a 
degree unthinkable before.6  Second, the Internet threatens the 
traditional territorial principle of copyright law.7  Finally, copy-
right law has acquired outstanding importance as a result of 
the “shift of emphasis from manufactured goods to ideas, infor-
  
 1. Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L. J. 
883, 884 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, Choice of Law]. 
 2. Mathias Reimann, A New Restatement-For the International Age, 75 
IND. L.J. 575, 579 (2000) (pointing out that “the number of international dis-
putes has grown continuously in the last few decades”). 
 3. Marshall Leaffer, International Copyright from an American Perspec-
tive, 43 ARK. L. REV. 373, 373 (1990) (noting that “the international dimension 
of copyright law grows in importance each day”).  
 4. Matt Jackson, Harmony or Discord? The Pressure Toward Conformity 
in International Copyright, 43 IDEA 607, 629 (2003); Leaffer, supra note 3, at 
373. 
 5. Curtis A. Bradley, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Intellectual 
Property Law: Principal Paper: Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an 
Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 503, 584 (1997). 
 6. Leaffer, supra note 3, at 373. 
 7. Id.  See also Paul Edward Geller, Conflicts of Law in Cyberspace: In-
ternational Copyright in a Digitally Networked World, in 4 INFORMATION LAW 
SERIES, THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 27, 28 (P. Bernt 
Hugenholtz ed., 1996) (pointing out that “[d]igital media allow transmitters 
and receivers to switch roles interactively, and to be linked among themselves 
in fluid and variegated patterns, potentially affecting both creation and dis-
semination at any and all points in increasingly global networks”). 
T
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mation, and images – the subject matter of intellectual prop-
erty….”8  
These factors exacerbate old legal problems and may even 
create new ones in international copyright disputes.9  One clus-
ter of traditional problems that has gained new importance is 
that of conflict of laws questions surrounding both initial copy-
right ownership and transfer of rights.10  
Problems regarding ownership and transfer of rights have 
been compounded by the growing transparency of national bor-
ders,11 the shift from industrial to information markets12 and 
burgeoning participation of copyrighted works in international 
commerce.13 
These changes have, in turn, put unbearable pressure on the 
traditional interpretation of the principle of national treatment 
enshrined in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Liter-
ary and Artistic Works.14  According to the conventional under-
standing of national treatment, the law of a protecting country 
should determine all the issues of copyright, including owner-
ship.15  This approach also comports with the related principle of 
territoriality because it regards copyright as consisting of sepa-
  
 8. Samuel K. Murumba, Globalizing Intellectual Property: Linkage and 
the Challenge of a Justice-Constituency, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 435, 435 
(1998). 
 9. Peter Nicolas, The Use of Preclusion Doctrine, Antisuit Injunctions, and 
Forum Non Convenience Dismissals in Transnational Intellectual Property 
Litigation, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 331, 334 (1999). 
 10. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 104 (2001); 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Ownership of Electronic Rights and the Private Interna-
tional Law of Copyright, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 165, 169–70 (1998) [here-
inafter Ginsburg, Ownership]. 
 11. Geller, supra note 7, at 28. 
 12. See Lorin Brennan, Financing Intellectual Property Under Revised 
Article 9: National and International Conflicts, HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 
313, 316 (2001); Jackson, supra note 4, at 628. 
 13. See Monica E. Antezana, The European Union Internet Copyright Di-
rective as Even More than it Envisions: Toward a Supra-EU Harmonization of 
Copyright Policy and Theory, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 415, 440 (2003); 
Jackson, supra note 4, at 627. 
 14. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (Paris revision, July 24, 1971) [hereinafter 
Berne Convention]. 
 15. See STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING 
RIGHTS 38–39 (2d ed. 1989); EUGEN ULMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 11 (1978). 
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rate sets of rights for each sovereign state.16  But the disparate 
copyright regimes envisioned by this conventional understand-
ing hinder the uniform worldwide exploitation of a literary 
work.17  It is for this reason that the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in Itar-Tass v. Russian Kurier, Inc. 
rejected this conventional interpretation of national treatment.18  
The court found that the national treatment principle did not 
contain a choice of law provision19 and held that ownership of a 
copyright should be determined by the law of the country with 
the most substantial relationship to the work.20  By rejecting the 
uniform application of the law of a protecting country, Itar-Tass 
imported the modern conflict of laws analysis into the world of 
copyright law, which, until that point, had completely ignored 
conflict of laws issues.21  Such an approach has the virtue of es-
tablishing a single root of title to copyrighted works, thus facili-
tating their distribution and exploitation.22  It is also more flexi-
ble than the traditional approach.  
However, its application creates a number of serious prob-
lems: the fact that a general conflict of laws approach eludes 
predictability; the difficulties associated with interpreting for-
eign laws and determining what degree of deference should be 
given to a foreign judiciary; and obstacles to enforcing decisions.  
In Films by Jove v. Berov (“Films by Jove II”), the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, attempting 
  
 16. Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a “Bundle” of Na-
tional Copyright Laws to a Supranational Code?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 265, 284, 289 (2000) [hereinafter Ginsburg, International Copyright]. 
 17. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litiga-
tion: A Vehicle for Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 
438–39 (2001) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property]; 
Ginsburg, International Copyright, supra note 16, at 284, 289. 
 18. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, 153 F.3d 82, 89–91 
(2d Cir. 1998). 
 19. Id. at 89.  See also Ginsburg, Ownership, supra note 10, at 168–69; 
William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 
383, 404 (2000) [hereinafter Patry, Choice of Law]; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, 
at 102–04. 
 20. Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 91. 
 21. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property, supra note 17, at 438–
40.  
 22. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 104; Ginsburg, Ownership, supra note 10, 
at 169–70. 
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to apply Itar-Tass, was confronted with many of these same 
problems.23 
A universal copyright regime would resolve these problems, 
but thus far it has remained an unattainable goal.24  In the 
meantime, scholars have developed two principle methods of 
ameliorating the difficulties: the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg procedural 
approach,25 and the substantive approach suggested by Graeme 
Dinwoodie.26 
This Note’s principal thesis is that, by themselves, these salu-
tary attempts to deal with a pressing problem are inadequate 
unless supplemented by the establishment of supranational 
equitable principles.  The establishment of a supranational 
body of equitable principles would be a step towards universal 
copyright law, and would be easier to achieve because it would 
not cause interference with sensitive policies underlying na-
tional copyright regimes.  Once established, the universal law of 
equity could help to protect third parties and good-faith pur-
chasers in transnational copyright transactions, thus facilitat-
ing worldwide exploitation and distribution of copyrighted 
works.  
Part I looks at the traditional approach of copyright law to 
conflict of laws problems under the Berne principle of national 
treatment.  Part II discusses the parallel universe of the conflict 
of laws doctrine, which has undergone a revolutionary shift 
from the territorial approach of the First Restatement27 to the 
  
 23. Films by Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 154 F. Supp. 2d 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) [here-
inafter Films by Jove I]; Films by Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 250 F. Supp. 2d 156 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter Films by Jove II]. 
 24. See Graeme W. Austin, Valuing “Domestic Self-Determination” in In-
ternational Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1155, 
1211 (2002) (commenting on “the need and ability for individual nations to do 
some things differently in the intellectual property sphere”).  
 25. See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Conven-
tion on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property 
Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1065 (2002). 
 26. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why Na-
tional Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000) 
[hereinafter Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order]; Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The 
Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of 
Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, The De-
velopment].   
 27. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).  
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modern functional analysis.28  Part III focuses on the rejection of 
territorial interpretation of the national treatment doctrine and 
acceptance of the modern conflict of laws doctrine by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Itar-Tass.  
Part IV discusses the problems involved in the application of 
the modern conflict of laws doctrine to the issue of copyright 
ownership and transfer of rights.  These problems are clearly 
demonstrated by the decisions of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York in Films by Jove I 
and II29 applying the Itar-Tass holding to a more complicated 
set of facts.  Finally, Part V suggests that many of these prob-
lems can be solved by the application of supranational equitable 
principles, in particular the doctrine of apparent authority, 
aimed at providing certainty and security in commercial trans-
actions. 
I.  CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE BERNE CONVENTION PRINCIPLE OF 
NATIONAL TREATMENT 
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Ar-
tistic Works (“Berne Convention”) is one of the most influential 
copyright treaties in the world.30  First established in 1886, in 
Berne, Switzerland,31 this Convention is now administered by 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), an in-
tergovernmental organization created under the auspices of the 
United Nations.32  Until March 1, 1989, “the United States was 
the only major western country not a member” of the Berne 
  
 28. See generally CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) 
[hereinafter CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS]; William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and 
the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1963); DAVID CAVERS, THE 
CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 22–23 (1965); Arthur Von Mehren, Recent Trends in 
Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 938 (1975). 
 29. Films by Jove I, 154 F. Supp. 2d 432; Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d 
156. 
 30. Stephen Fraser, The Copyright Battle: Emerging International Rules 
and Roadblocks on the Global Information Infrastructure, 15 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 759, 762. 
 31. Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Key Role in the 
Future, 3 J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (1998). 
 32. World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Website, at http:// 
www.wipo.org/about-wipo/en/gib.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).  
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Convention33 that at that time encompassed some 85 nations, 
including America’s major trading partners.34  China joined 
WIPO in 199235 and Russia followed suit in 1995.36 
A.  National Treatment as a Compromise Between Universal 
Copyright and National Policies 
Article I of the Berne Convention unambiguously states that 
“[t]he countries to which this Convention applies constitute a 
Union for the protection of the rights of authors in their literary 
and artistic works.”37  The leading authority on the Convention, 
Professor Sam Ricketson, notes that “the expression ‘author’ is 
left unidentified, although it occurs with great frequency 
throughout the substantive provisions of the Convention.”38  
This is because the main focus of the Berne Convention was not 
so much on authorship as on the protection given to authors.39  
Since the very inception of the Berne Convention, two distinct 
approaches to the protection of authors’ rights “have vied for 
primacy.”40  These principles are “the non discrimination princi-
ple of national treatment” which “preserves the integrity of do-
mestic legislation,” and the principle of universal copyright 
norms, which “guarantee[s] international uniformity and pre-
dictability.”41  At the diplomatic conference of 1884, one of the 
preparatory stages to the Berne Convention,42 the German dele-
gation declared itself a “strong supporter of universal codifica-
tion,”43 proposing the following question to the Conference: 
  
 33. MARSHALL LEAFFER, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 357 (2d ed. 1997). 
 34. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 513 (1999) [here-
inafter UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW]. 
 35. Connie Neigel, Piracy in Russia and China: A Different U.S. Reaction, 
63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 179, 193 (2000). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 1.  See also Burger, supra note 
31, at 16 (pointing out that this focus on the protection of authors indicated 
the Continental European influence). 
 38. SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 158 (1987). 
 39. Id. at 39. 
 40. Ginsburg, International Copyright, supra note 16, at 267. 
 41. Id. at 267. 
 42. RICKETSON, supra note 38, at 58. 
 43. Id. at 59. 
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Instead of concluding a convention based on the principle of 
national treatment, would it not be preferable to aim for a 
codification, in the framework of a convention, regulating in a 
uniform manner for the whole projected Union, and in the 
framework of a convention, the totality of dispositions relating 
to the protection of copyright?44 
The French, Swedish and Swiss delegations did not approve 
of this initiative “in the light of the many differences in national 
copyright law which still existed.”45  Instead, the parties ac-
cepted a compromise motion of the Swiss Government which 
stated: 
Whereas, desirable as may be a universal codification of the 
principles which regulate the protection of the rights of au-
thors, in view of the differences in existing laws and conven-
tions, it is to be feared that such a project would postpone for a 
long time the conclusion of a general understanding….46  
Although the agreed upon approach “institutes national 
treatment,” it also tries to avoid local underprotection by creat-
ing a floor of minimum substantive standards that member 
countries must adopt.”47  Both tenets are embodied in Article 
5(1) of the Convention which states that: 
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are 
protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union 
other than the country of origin, the rights which their respec-
tive laws do now and or may hereafter grant to their nation-
als, as well as the rights specifically granted by this Conven-
tion.48  
The principle of national treatment requires member states 
to afford copyright owners from other Berne countries the same 
protection as that accorded to their own citizens.49  
  
 44. RICKETSON, supra note 38, at 59. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Ginsburg, International Copyright, supra note 16, at 267. 
 48. Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 5(1). 
 49. 2 WILLIAM PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 1273 (1994).  
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B.  The Traditional Territorial Approach to National  
Treatment  
Traditionally, the principle of national treatment was under-
stood as a territorial approach, dictating that the law of a pro-
tecting country applies to all issues in international copyright 
disputes.50  A prominent European scholar, Eugen Ulmer, spe-
cifically states that “the question of who is the first owner of 
copyright is also decided in accordance with the law of the coun-
try where protection is claimed.”51  Although there is some am-
biguity as to whether a protecting country should be interpreted 
as a forum country or a country of infringement,52 most scholars 
believe a protecting country to be a forum country.53  This pref-
erence for the forum law is premised upon the greater comfort 
that courts feel in applying their own law as opposed to foreign 
law;54 this comfort is expected, in turn, to improve the quality of 
judgments55 and to guarantee more certainty.56  An additional 
benefit of this approach is that owners of rights are not affected 
by confiscation or exploitation measures in the country of the 
work’s origin whenever these measures are invalid in the pro-
tecting countries; for instance, “where a publisher had been ex-
propriated in East Germany, the West German courts held that 
his reproduction and distribution rights in the Federal Republic 
are not affected.”57 
The principle of national treatment was reinforced by the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPs”) in 1994.58  Although TRIPs relies mainly on the 
  
 50. Edward J. Ellis, National Treatment under the Berne Convention and 
the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 36 IDEA 327, 331 (1996).  
 51. ULMER, supra note 15, at 11. 
 52. RICKETSON, supra note 38, at 226 (commenting that “it remains an 
open question under the Convention” whether a protecting country should be 
interpreted as a forum country or a country where an infringing act occurred, 
although in most cases they will be the same). 
 53. STEWART, supra note 15, at 37 (pointing out that the Berne Convention 
in its principle of national treatment accepted “broadly speaking lex fori”). 
 54. STEWART, supra note 15, at 37. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 39. 
 58. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round 
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Berne Convention principles,59 its protection of copyright goes 
further than Berne.60 The primary significance of TRIPs is “the 
extension of the enforcement mechanism of the [World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”)] to intellectual property obligations.”61  
An important aspect of the TRIPs Agreement was treating 
copyright as “a trade issue rather than an information policy 
issue.”62  For instance, “[t]he ultimate decision of developing 
countries to consent to TRIPs was not motivated by a belief that 
greater protection for [Intellectual Property]” was in their in-
terest; it was prompted, instead, “by a desire to obtain conces-
sions in other areas.”63  
Scholars agree that dispute resolution based on TRIPs and 
the WTO framework evidences the beginning of the formation of 
uniform international copyright law.64  Nevertheless, although 
TRIPs strengthens and broadens copyright protection some-
what, it preserves the dichotomy between international and 
domestic laws by creating a floor — not a ceiling — for the copy-
right protection member states are obligated to enact into their 
domestic laws.  Consequently, it retains the national treatment 
principle that “private litigation would be resolved by the appli-
cation of national law.”65 
II.  THE CONFLICT OF LAWS REVOLUTION IN CONTRACT  
  AND TORT LAW 
International copyright law has long escaped the reach of the 
general conflict of laws analysis because it adhered to the con-
ventional interpretation of the national treatment doctrine, ac-
cording to which, “the courts in the state where infringement 
occurs nearly always apply their own national law.”66  Copyright 
  
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).  See also Ruth Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settle-
ment and the Sources of (International) Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 585, 585 (2001). 
 59. Id. at 598. 
 60. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 34, at 539 (char-
acterizing TRIPs as a “‘Berne plus’ approach to protection”). 
 61. Okediji, supra note 58, at 634. 
 62. Jackson, supra note 4, at 635. 
 63. Andrew T. Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO, 43 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 933, 950 (2003) [hereinafter Guzman, International Antitrust]. 
 64. See Okediji, supra note 58, at 634–35; Jackson, supra note 4, at 622. 
 65. Dinwoodie, The Development, supra note 26, at 777. 
 66. STEWART, supra note 15, at 39. 
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law, thus, remained territorial and isolated from the parallel 
conflict of laws revolution that had taken place in tort and con-
tract cases67 where the rigid territorial approach was displaced 
by various forms of “interest analysis.”68 
A.  Beale’s Territorial Approach of  “Vested Rights” 
The traditional territorial approach in the American conflict 
of laws doctrine had been represented by Joseph Beale,69 a re-
porter for Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws.70  His doctrine 
of “vested rights” was based “on a view that every state has ex-
clusive jurisdiction over its territory.”71  Beale stated that “a 
right having been created by the appropriate law, the recogni-
tion of its existence should follow everywhere.”72  However, al-
though Beale’s approach was very influential and enjoyed sup-
port among scholars and the courts when pronounced, it came 
under widespread criticism, in the 1950s and 1960s, for its in-
flexibility and arbitrariness in the choice of the moment when 
rights vested and, consequently, the jurisdiction, under which 
rights have vested.  According to Beale’s general principle, 
“[r]ights were considered to have vested in the jurisdiction 
where the last act necessary to complete the cause of action oc-
curred.”73  For instance, in the case of torts, the rigid rule dic-
tated that the jurisdiction where the rights of the parties vested 
was the place of the wrong;74 in contracts, the place of the con-
tract formation.75  Needless to say, such a rule often brought 
arbitrary and unjust results.76 
  
 67. Kurt Siehr, Revolution and Evolution in Conflicts Law, 60 LA. L. REV. 
1353, 1353 (2000). 
 68. See generally CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 28; Baxter, supra 
note 28; CAVERS, supra note 28. 
 69. See generally JOSEPH BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935).  
See also Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE 
L.J. 1191, 1194 (1987). 
 70. Guzman, Choice of Law, supra note 1, at 890. 
 71. Id. 
 72. JAMES A. MARTIN, PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS: CHOICE OF LAW 
5 (1980) (citing JOSEPH BEALE, THE SUMMARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS). 
 73. Guzman, Choice of Law, supra note 1, at 891. 
 74. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934). 
 75. Id. § 332. 
 76. See, e.g., Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126 
(1892) (where the court of Alabama denied compensation to an injured em-
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B.  A Revolution in the Conflict of Laws Analysis  
1.  Currie’s Interest Analysis: True and False Conflicts 
The main critic of Beale’s territorial approach in the 1950s 
and 1960s was Brainerd Currie.77  Currie developed “an interest 
analysis” by arguing that: “[w]hen a court is asked to apply the 
law of a foreign state different from the law of the forum, it 
should inquire into the policies expressed in the respective laws, 
and into the circumstances in which it is reasonable for the re-
spective states to assert an interest in the application of those 
policies.”78  Curry divided conflicts of laws into two main groups: 
false conflicts and true conflicts.79  In a “false conflict” case, the 
interests of the respective states do not conflict,80 so “[if] the 
court finds that one state has an interest in the application of 
its policy in the circumstances of the case and the other has 
none, it should apply the law of the only interested state.”81  Un-
fortunately, the situation becomes much more complicated 
where a “true conflict” between states’ interests exists.  In that 
case, Currie argued that “where several states have different 
policies, and also legitimate interests in the application of their 
policies, a court is in no position to ‘weigh’ the competing inter-
ests, or evaluate their relative merits, and choose between them 
accordingly.”82  Therefore, in true conflicts, he recommends the 
use of the law of the forum: “[i]f…the court finds that a conflict 
  
ployee of  a defendant railroad having applied the law of Mississippi as a place 
of injury, although both the plaintiff and the defendant were residents of  
Alabama, the law of which would have allowed the recovery). 
 77. Dane, supra note 69, at 1201. 
 78. Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 
1233, 1242 (1963) reprinted in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICT OF 
LAWS (1963) [hereinafter Currie, Comments]. 
 79. Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-
Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 251–52 (1958), reprinted in SELECTED 
ESSAYS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) [hereinafter Currie, Married Women’s 
Contracts].  See also MARTIN, supra note 72, at 85 (noting that Currie’s most 
important contribution to the choice of law doctrine was his theory of false 
conflicts). 
 80. Currie, Married Women’s Contracts, supra note 79, at 251–52.  See also 
Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 301 (1969) for a good example of the applica-
tion of an interest analysis to a “false conflict”. 
 81. Currie, Comments, supra note 78, at 1242. 
 82. Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflicts of 
Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 176 (1959). 
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between the legitimate interests of the two states is unavoid-
able, it should apply the law of the forum.”83  
Although Currie’s approach to false conflicts is accepted by 
the majority of courts and commentators today,84 his treatment 
of true conflicts has often been considered too parochial.  It has 
been rejected by many scholars85 who criticize it for discriminat-
ing unfairly against nonresidents,86 encouraging forum shop-
ping,87 and making it impossible to know in advance what law 
will be applied.88  Additionally, critics argue that a preference 
for the forum law does not give proper consideration to “a whole 
range of policies and values…relating to effective and harmoni-
ous intercourse and relations between and among communi-
ties….”89  
2.  Alternative Solutions to “True Conflicts” 
In response to the above critique, alternative solutions for the 
“true conflicts” approach were suggested.  Professor William 
Baxter, for instance, developed a comparative impairment doc-
trine which stated that: “normative resolution of real conflicts 
cases is possible where one of the assertedly applicable rules is 
more pertinent to the case than the competing rule.”90  In con-
tracts, another approach emerged advocating the validity of the 
contract.91  According to this principle, in a dispute between par-
ties with equal bargaining power, a contract should be upheld 
as valid if it is valid under any law which the parties could have 
reasonably taken into account.92  
  
 83. Currie, Comments, supra note 78, at 1242–43. 
 84. MARTIN, supra note 72, at 85.  
 85. Alfred Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
1585, 1592–93 (1985). 
 86. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 276 (1992). 
 87. Baxter, supra note 28, at 9–10. 
 88. CAVERS, supra note 28, at 22–23. 
 89. Mehren, supra note 28, at 938.  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).  
 90. Baxter, supra note 28, at 9–10. 
 91. See generally ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 
(1962).  See also ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW  (1967). 
 92. Id. 
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3.  The Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws 
Widespread dissatisfaction with the territorial approach of 
the First Restatement continued and eventually prompted the 
American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of the Law of 
Conflict of Laws.93  Professor Willis Reese, a reporter for the 
Second Restatement, signaled that “conflict of laws is in a state 
of flux,”94 and pointed out that “wide differences presently exist 
with respect to underlying objectives and values.”95  He then 
suggested that the Second Restatement “reflects contemporary 
trends and cross currents respecting choice of law.”96  
The Second Restatement is built around the “the concept of 
locating the state with the ‘the most significant relationship’ to 
the parties and the occurrence or transaction giving rise to a 
lawsuit, and then applying that state’s law.”97  This principle is 
behind all black-letter rules of the Second Restatement, cast in 
the form of presumptions, which are rebuttable by the general 
principles stated at the beginning of both chapters on torts and 
contracts.98  In turn, these general principles have to be “read in 
the light of the choice-influencing principles of section 6,”99 
which is open-ended and policy-oriented,100 and reads as follows: 
1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a 
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law. 
2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the 
choice of the applicable rule of law include 
a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, 
b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
c) the relevant policies  of other interested states and the 
relative interests of those states in the determination of 
the particular issue, 
  
 93. MARTIN, supra note 72, at 38. 
 94. Willis Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 680 (1963). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Mehren, supra note 28, at 964. 
 97. Harold P. Southerland, A Plea for the Proper Use of the Second Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws, 27 VT. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002). 
 98. Id. at 8. 
 99. Id. at 9. 
 100. Id. at 8. 
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d) the protection of justified expectations, 
e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
g) ease in the determination and application of the law to 
be applied. 101 
Although the Second Restatement has been favorably re-
ceived by judges, most academics have sharply criticized it,102 
pointing out that its “unprincipled eclecticism has done little to 
strengthen the intellectual underpinnings of our discipline.”103  
In sum, the Second Restatement is a true reflection of the 
continued flux in conflict of laws analysis.  Discussing the idea 
of creating the Third Restatement, a prominent scholar has 
summarized the current situation in conflict of laws by stating: 
“We simply cannot agree.”104  This state of flux is deepened by a 
noticeable shift from a state perspective to an individual per-
spective105 and from a domestic perspective to international 
one.106   
III.  THE CONFLICT OF LAWS REVOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL         
COPYRIGHT 
A.  Conflict of Laws Issues Under the Traditional Interpretation    
of the National Treatment Doctrine 
Having rejected the territorial interpretation of national 
treatment, copyright law has inherited all the flexibility, but 
also the confusion, of the modern “interest analysis.”  Until re-
cently, run of the mill international copyright controversies 
have not contained any difficult choice of law issues, and the 
principal copyright treatises hardly needed to give more than a 
passing discussion of conflict of laws issues.107  The same is true 
  
 101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). 
 102. DAVID CURRIE, HERMA HILL KAY, LARRY KRAMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 222 
(2001). 
 103. Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflict Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403, 
405 (2000). 
 104. Aaron D. Twerski, One Size Does Not Fit All, 75 IND. L.J. 667, 667 
(2000). 
 105. See generally Guzman, Choice of Law, supra note 1. 
 106. See Reimann, supra note 2, at 576; Juenger, supra note 103, at 414. 
 107. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property, supra note 17, at 429.  
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of the major conflict of laws treatises, which have reciprocally 
tended to give intellectual property short shrift.108  
This lack of interest from the perspective of U.S. conflicts 
scholars is explained by the fact that “the domestic multistate 
dispute has prevailed as the model for primary judicial and 
scholarly attention to conflicts issues in the United States.”109  
Copyright controversies did not present any serious issues in 
multistate domestic disputes because of preemptive federal leg-
islation.110  On the other hand, in international copyright cases, 
it was assumed that the Berne Convention principle of national 
treatment, interpreted as a territorial approach, led to the 
proposition that the law of the forum was the applicable law.111  
B.  Rejection of the Traditional Interpretation 
1.  Need for Uniform Marketability of Title 
Globalization has dramatically changed all that.  “Increased 
global exploitation of copyrighted works and trademarked 
products has…forced courts and scholars to reconsider the ap-
parent simplicity of choice of law questions in intellectual prop-
erty cases.”112  This change of attitude was specifically influ-
enced by two main factors: the difficulty in locating the exact 
territory where a copyrighted work originated or was dissemi-
nated;113 and the importance, for the sake of efficient world-wide 
exploitation of copyrighted works, of having a single copyright 
that can be enforced throughout the world.114  
Efficient worldwide dissemination of copyright is closely tied 
up with the question of predictability and certainty.  In his 
work on copyright, Paul Goldstein states that “[o]f all the crite-
ria against which a choice of law rule is to be measured, none is 
more salient that the predictability that promotes certainty in 
copyright transactions.”115  In the issue of ownership, “transna-
  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 431. 
 110. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 
U.S.C. 101-803 (2000)). 
 111. STEWART, supra note 15, at 38–39. 
 112. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property, supra note 17, at 438. 
 113. Geller, supra note 7, at 28. 
 114. Patry, Choice of Law, supra note 19, at 392. 
 115. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 101. 
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tional certainty…may best be served by a rule that establishes 
a single root of title for copyright in a work, possibly in the 
work’s country of origin.”116  This point of view is supported by 
other scholars advocating the work’s source country (country of 
first publication, or domicile, or nationality of the author) as 
determining “who is the initial title holder”117 because “that 
choice of law rule ensures that the work will not change owners 
by operation of law each time the work crosses an international 
boundary.”118 
2.  A New Era for the Conflict of Laws in International  
Copyright Disputes: Itar-Tass v. Kurier 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Itar-Tass accepted the source country approach by holding that, 
in international copyright disputes, the issue of ownership 
should be governed by the law of the work’s country of origin.119   
The case involved a copyright infringement suit by several 
Russian newspapers and the Itar-Tass news agency against a 
Russian-language newspaper published in New York.  The 
plaintiffs complained that the defendant had copied materials 
from their newspapers.  Since the copying was obvious and un-
disguised, the only issue of note in the case was the plaintiffs’ 
standing to bring the action which, in turn, depended on owner-
ship of the copyright.  It was a momentous issue, which re-
quired the Second Circuit, for the very first time, to deal with 
copyright ownership in the context of conflict of laws.120  Judge 
Newman concluded that the Berne Convention principle of na-
tional treatment does not contain choice of law rules.121  Then 
the court proceeded to “fill in the interstices…by developing 
federal common law on the conflicts issue.”122  Judge Newman 
reasoned that “copyright is a form of property” and in relation 
  
 116. Id. at 102. 
 117. Ginsburg, Ownership, supra note 10, at 169. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, 153 F.3d 82, 91 (2d 
Cir. 1998). 
 120. Id. at 88. It is also interesting to note that the District Court applied 
Russian law to the issue of ownership without considering the conflict of laws 
issue therein.  Id. 
 121. Id. at 89.   
 122. Id. at 90. 
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to property, under the Second Restatement’s approach, the gov-
erning law is “determined by the law of the state with ‘the most 
significant relationship’ to the property and to the parties.”123  
Relying on the Second Restatement the court concluded that 
Russian law should govern the issue of ownership.124  Under 
that law, newspaper articles are exempted from the general 
work-for-hire doctrine, so the newspaper plaintiffs did not own 
copyright in the separate articles written by their employees.  
Consequently, they lacked standing to bring the action.125 
Although the principle announced in Itar-Tass — that initial 
ownership is determined by the law of the country of a work’s 
origin, and that infringement is determined by the law of the 
country of infringement — was initially disapproved by some 
commentators,126 it is now generally accepted by most academ-
ics.127  While the Itar-Tass court explicitly stated that it did not 
make any ruling regarding transfer or assignment of copy-
rights,128 the facts of Itar-Tass presented an opportune pattern 
for easy transition from the traditional territorial interpretation 
of the national treatment principle to a more flexible approach, 
because those facts unambiguously pointed to Russia as the 
country of origin, and the difference between Russian and 
American law was outcome-determinative.129 
Unfortunately, this bright-line rule loses its simplicity in a 
slightly different set of facts.  This is because, as the leading 
  
 123. Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 90. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 92–93 (holding, however, that the news agency plaintiff owned 
the copyright in the work of its employees because it was not excluded from 
the work-for-hire doctrine, under the Russian law). 
 126. See, e.g., David E. Miller, Finding a Conflicts Issue in International 
Copyright Litigation: Did the Second Circuit Misinterpret the Berne Conven-
tion in Itar-Tass?, 8 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 239, 246 (2000) (blaming the 
court for creating conflicts of law by ignoring history, rejecting legal scholar-
ship, and ignoring relevant precedent.”). 
 127. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property, supra note 17, at 439; 
LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW supra note 34, at 529; Paul Torre-
mans, Choice of Law Issues in Relation to Copyright, in COPYRIGHT IN THE 
CULTURAL INDUSTRIES 32, 42 (Ruth Towse ed., 2002 ); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 
10, at 103. 
 128. Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 84. 
 129. Id. at 88.  The District Court in Itar-Tass applied Russian Law without 
even considering the choice of law issues in this case and their relation to the 
Berne principle of national treatment.  Id.  
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treatise on copyright law points out, “[b]y looking to U.S. law as 
the lex loci delicti to determine infringement and remedies, but 
looking to the law of the “home country” to determine threshold 
issues, Itar-Tass raises a host of issues.”130  These fall into three 
broad categories: (1) those relating to initial copyright owner-
ship; (2) those concerned with transfer of the copyright interest; 
and (3) those arising from the copyright-contract dichotomy.  
The first cluster, that concerning copyright ownership, en-
compasses possible difficulties in separating the issues of own-
ership and infringement; application of the U.S. work-for-hire 
doctrine to the different settings of other countries’ laws; and, of 
course, the difficulties associated with determining foreign 
laws.131  Additional complications can arise in conflict of laws 
analysis from the possibility of more than one country being 
designated a country of origin132 “when nationality, domicile, 
place of creation, or first publication are not united in the same 
country.”133  Thus, the Itar-Tass approach solves the territorial-
ity problem of national treatment, but also opens up for copy-
right disputes the Pandora’s box of conflict of laws problems 
that have long dogged other spheres of law, such as torts and 
contracts.134   
Itar-Tass also expressly left open the question of which law 
governs the transfer of initial copyright ownership.135  According 
to Nimmer on Copyright (“Nimmer”), it would be illogical to 
look to the law of the state with the most significant relation-
ship to the property and parties in determining copyright own-
ership, but not to do the same thing in the “realm of assign-
ments” 136  
  
 130. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
17.05(3) (2000) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Professor Ginsburg points out that relevant factors in determination of 
the law governing initial ownership of a work for hire can be: (1) country of a 
nationality of an employee; (2) country of a nationality of an employer; (3) 
country where the contract was localized or country determined by the choice 
of law clause in the contract; (4) country of the first publication; or (5) country 
of forum.  Ginsburg, Ownership, supra note 10, at 168. 
 133. Patry, Choice of Law, supra note 19, at 421. 
 134. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property, supra note 17, at 442. 
 135. Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 91 n.11. 
 136. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 130, § 17.05(2). 
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Nevertheless, the unwillingness of the Itar-Tass court to 
tackle the conflict of laws in copyright assignments is under-
standable because this problem is even more complicated than 
that of initial ownership.  One aspect of it is the fundamental 
question of whether copyright is transferable at all, since “some 
legal systems allow for transfer of the copyright itself, while 
others do not.”137  In general, civil law countries tend to be very 
protective of individual authors at the expense of the policy of 
free alienability favored by common law countries.138  Where an 
author from a civil law country makes the kind of transfer of his 
or her rights to a U.S. party that that author’s country prohib-
its, but U.S. law allows, a true conflict problem can arise.139  
Additionally, different outcomes can result from restrictions 
on alienation being characterized — as they often are — as be-
longing to the sphere of contracts, not copyright law.140 As Pro-
fessor Ginsburg points out, “[c]oncerning transfers of copyright 
ownership, potentially applicable choice of law rules include:  
(1) the law chosen by the parties to the contract; (2) the law of 
the country in which the contract can be localized; (3) the law of 
the forum.”141  Thus, the logical extension of the interest-
analysis in Itar-Tass to the assignments of copyrights can com-
plicate the potential conflict of laws issues. 
IV.  APPLICATION OF THE ITAR-TASS APPROACH  
    IN FILMS BY JOVE V. BEROV 
A.  Facts of Films by Jove v. Berov 
The decision of the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of New York in Films by Jove clearly illustrates 
both the merits of the Itar-Tass approach and the significant 
  
 137. Torremans, supra note 127, at 45. 
 138. Patry, Choice of Law, supra note 19, at 432. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Ginsburg, Ownership, supra note 10, at 169.  See also Patry, Choice of 
Law, supra note 19, at 433 (citing the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, 
which also enumerates a number of possible factors determining the applica-
ble law in contract conflict).  “[T]he place of contracting, the place of negotia-
tion of the contract, the place of performance, the location of the subject mat-
ter of the contract, and the domicile, residency, nationality, place of incorpora-
tion and place of business of the parties.”  Id. 
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difficulties discussed above.  Nimmer refers to Films by Jove as 
a complex example of choice of law issues in international copy-
right.142  Films by Jove had a pattern of facts uniquely suited to 
test the Itar-Tass approach.  This case involved the issue of 
ownership of copyright in approximately 1,500 animated films 
produced by the film studio Soyuzmultfilm in Russia between 
1936 and 1991.  But, while the issue of ownership in this case 
seems, at first blush, to be similar to that in Itar-Tass, it can be 
distinguished by some important legal and social factors.  The 
legal factors include the fact that the animated films in Films 
by Jove were restored works;143 that they were covered by the 
Berne Convention § 14 bis regarding cinematographic works;144 
and that there was a transfer of copyrights from the initial 
rightholder.145  The social factors involved are the significant 
public importance of the copyrighted subject-matter in this 
case146 as well as the somewhat unusual position taken by the 
Russian government in displaying a very strong interest in this 
subject-matter.147  
Because the subject-matter of a controversy often determines 
the outcome of a legal analysis, it seems logical to begin the dis-
cussion of this case with the description of the animated films 
involved in this controversy, their social importance, and the 
complicated transactions in which they were involved before 
proceeding to the legal analysis of the issue.   
1.  The Subject Matter of the Case: Cheburashka 
The 1500 animated films at issue in Films by Jove were chil-
dren’s classics in Russia.  Each of them would reward separate 
discussion, but four films dedicated to a personage called Che-
  
 142. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 130, § 9.A.04 [B][2] n.92. 
 143. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(b) (1995) (“a restored work vests initially in the au-
thor or initial rightholder of the work as determined by the law of the source 
country.”). 
 144. Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 14bis. 
 145. See generally Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d 156. 
 146. Pavell, O Svoystvakh Cheburashki [About Cheburashka’s Characteris-
tics], in TOPOS (2003), at http://www.topos.ru/cgi.bin/articles.pl?id=1441.  See 
also Alexander Bratersky, Who Owns Little Cheburashka?, 736 ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES (Jan. 15, 2002), available at http://www.sptimesrussia. 
com/archives/times/736/top/t_5515.htm.   
 147. See generally Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d 156. 
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burashka stand apart.  Cheburashka is an exotic small brown 
animal with big ears and big eyes whose adventures are de-
scribed in books of the Soviet writer Uspenskiy.148  These books 
served as the foundation for a popular series of animated films.  
The prominent role of these films is underscored by the Russian 
press’ reference to Cheburashka movies as being at the heart of 
this controversy in Films by Jove.149  Several generations of peo-
ple in the Soviet Union were brought up with a firm belief that 
Cheburashka films were a national property, an attitude that 
persists even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and 
turns the issue of copyright ownership in this case into a locally 
sensitive matter.  
In 1992, the plaintiff, an American enterprise named Films 
by Jove, Inc., entered into a licensing agreement with the lease 
enterprise Soyuzmultfilm Studios (“SMS”), allegedly a legal suc-
cessor of a state enterprise of the same name, Soyuzmultfilm 
Studios (“Soyuzmultfilm”).150  Under this agreement, Films by 
Jove, Inc. acquired the right of exclusive international distribu-
tion for the animated films produced by Soyuzmultfilm.151  Sub-
sequently, Films by Jove, Inc. invested about three million dol-
lars in the restoration of the films and granted to the defendant, 
Berov, a right to distribute them through his retail stores in 
Brooklyn.152  When Berov violated the terms of the agreement, 
Films by Jove, Inc. sued him for copyright infringement.153  
Berov conceded the issue of infringement,154 but the case was 
dramatically complicated by the intervention of a third party 
plaintiff.  
The third party, Federal State Unitarian Enterprise Soyuz-
multfilm Studios (“FSUESMS”), is owned and controlled by the 
  
 148. USPENSKIY E., VSE O CHEBURASHKE I KROKODILE GENE [Everything 
about Cheburashka and Crocodile Gena] (1967). 
 149. See Nickolay Kononov, Teper’ Ya Cheburashka [Now I am Chebu-
rashka], IZVESTIYARU (2003), available at http:www.izvestia.ru/community/ 
34588 [hereinafter Kononov, Teper’ Ya Cheburashka].  See also Sergey Zakin, 
Komu prinadlezhit Cheburashka? [Who does Cheburashka Belong to?], BBC 
RUSSIAN.COM (June 30, 2003), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/newsid_30 
33000/3033198.stm. 
 150. Films by Jove I, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 446. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 434. 
File: Gannamacro.doc Created on:  2/14/2004 4:07 PM Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:48 PM 
920 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:2 
Russian state.  FSUESMS alleged that it was the true owner of 
the copyrighted material because it was the only lawful succes-
sor to Soyuzmultfilm.  According to FSUESMS, SMS was not 
the owner of the copyrights and, therefore, could not grant an 
exclusive distribution license to Films by Jove, Inc.  The ques-
tion of ownership, thus, became the controlling issue in the 
case.  
2.  District Court’s Analysis 
Relying on the Itar-Tass ruling, Judge Trager held that ini-
tial ownership in copyright disputes should be governed by the 
law of the country with the most significant relation to the mat-
ter in question.  The country with the most significant relation 
to the films here was clearly Russia, since the animated films 
were produced there by the Soviet enterprise Soyuzmultfilm 
Studios.  During perestroika, this state enterprise was trans-
formed into a lease enterprise also called Soyuzmultfilm Stu-
dios, which entered into the agreement with Films by Jove in 
1992.  Thus, the issue of ownership was to be decided in accor-
dance with Soviet-Russian law.  Additionally, the court noted 
that the animated films were “restored works.”155  The Uruguay 
Rounds Agreements Act of 1995 17 U.S.C. 104A(b), which pro-
vides for restoration of copyright in certain foreign works that 
had fallen into the public domain for non-compliance with for-
malities, states that ownership of a restored work belongs to 
“the author or initial rightholder of the work as determined by 
the law of the source country of the work.”156  This provision, too, 
seems to support the Itar-Tass rule dictating the choice of Rus-
sian law.  Therefore, Judge Trager applied Russian law to the 
facts of the case.157  
  
 155. Id. at 448. 
 156. 17 U.S.C. 104A(b) (1995). 
 157. It is interesting that the court did not mention the provision of the 
Berne Convention expressly providing for the issues of ownership to cine-
matographic work in either of its two decisions.  See generally Films by Jove I, 
154 F. Supp. 2d 432; Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d 156.  The Itar-Tass 
court mentioned this provision in passing, remarking that “[t]he Convention 
does not purport to settle issues of ownership, with one exception not relevant 
to this case.”  Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 91.  This exception provides that  “owner-
ship of copyright in a cinematographic work shall be a matter for legislation in 
the country where protection is claimed.”  Id. at 91 n.12 (citing Berne Conven-
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Judge Trager saw the central issue as whether the lease en-
terprise, Soyuzmultfilm Studios, was the rightful owner of the 
copyrights to the films – for, if it was, then it had the power to 
grant Films by Jove, Inc. the exclusive right to distribute them 
abroad.  Matters, however, were hardly that simple.  The court 
faced the difficult problem of trudging through the legal jungle 
of the privatization process in post-Soviet Russia and of wading 
through the complex legal metamorphosis of the Soviet state 
enterprise Soyuzmultfilm, which first turned into a lease enter-
prise in 1989,158 and then became a joint stock company in 
1999.159  Additionally, the court had to sort out the formation, in 
1999, of the FSUESMS, which also claimed to be a successor to 
Soyuzmultfilm.   
After a detailed and thoughtful discussion of the relevant So-
viet-Russian law, the court concluded that the Soviet state en-
terprise Soyuzmultfilm was the initial owner of the copy-
rights,160 which were thereafter transferred to the lease enter-
prise by operation of law161 when the state enterprise was trans-
formed into the lease enterprise.162  Consequently, these rights 
  
tion, Art 14bis(2)(a)).  Although the Itar-Tass court discussed what implicit 
meaning this provision could have for the works not included in the above-
mentioned provision, its meaning for the works included in the provision also 
remains open to interpretation.  However, the Berne Convention is not self-
executory.  This means that its provisions can be binding on domestic U.S. 
courts only through implementation by legislation passed by Congress.  Addi-
tionally, in the case of Films by Jove, this provision is in conflict with U.S. 
Copyright Law vesting ownership of a restored work in  “the author or initial 
rightholder of the work as determined by the law of the source country of the 
work.”  17 U.S.C. 104A(b). 
 158. Films by Jove I, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 435. 
 159. Id. at 436. 
 160. Id. at 456 n.28. 
 161. The court  referred to Itar-Tass’ explicit exclusion of  the assignment of 
rights issue from the holding of the case and stated that there was no reason 
to consider assignment of rights in this case because, at the heart of the con-
troversy here, is the issue of the ownership.  Id. at 477 n.42.  Although the 
court seemed to avoid venturing into a new land of conflict of laws in copy-
right assignments, its decision is justified by the purely domestic character of 
the copyright transfers.  According to Nimmer, it was perfectly logical in a 
domestic dispute to use the law of the source country to determine the issue of 
assignment as well as the issue of ownership.  NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra 
note 130, § 17.05(2). 
 162. Films by Jove I, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 477. 
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were not limited by the lease, and its expiration did not cause 
them to expire.163 
In its analysis, the court considered numerous inconsistent 
decisions from Russian commercial courts (Arbitrazh courts) of 
different levels,164 where the adversaries (SMS and the 
FSUESMS) disputed the validity of each other’s corporate regis-
tration.165  The most relevant opinion, however, was that of a 
lower level court (Moscow Region Arbitrazh Court) on December 
26, 2000, stating that “…copyrights to animated films created 
by the state enterprise ‘Film Studios Soyuzmultfilm’ were 
transferred by operation of law to its successor – lease enter-
prise ‘Film Studios Soyuzmultfilm.’”166  They could, therefore, 
not be transferred by the lease agreement nor limited by an-
other agreement.167  Although this decision was later vacated by 
the intermediate court (the Federal Arbitrazh Court for the Dis-
trict of Moscow), the Films by Jove court found the vacating de-
cision to be “incoherent and, more important, irrelevant to the 
issue of copyright transfer.”168  The court concluded that the rea-
soning of the December 26th opinion “remained unscathed.”169  
Judge Trager also relied on the implication in the case record 
that the court of the highest level in Russia (the Higher Arbi-
trazh Court of the Russian Federation) might have a different 
view of the case.170  The District Court, therefore, granted sum-
mary judgment to the plaintiffs on August 27, 2001.171  
Contrary to the District Court’s expectations, however, the 
Higher Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation issued an 
opinion three months later in favor of FSUESMS — overruling 
the lower courts’ decisions.172  The Higher Court stated that “the 
  
 163. Id. 
 164. Russian commercial courts consist of  “a lower court level, an appeals 
court level, a second appellate court level in the Federal Arbitrazh Court for 
the District of Moscow and a final appellate level in the Higher Arbitrazh 
Court of the Russian Federal.”  Id. at 439 n.17.  See also HIROSHI ODA, 
RUSSIAN COMMERCIAL LAW 24–28 (2002). 
 165. Films by Jove I, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 439–46. 
 166. Id. at 441 (quoting the decision of Moscow Region Arbitrazh Court). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 474. 
 169. Id. at 475. 
 170. Films by Jove I, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 474. 
 171. Id. at 480. 
 172. Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 158. 
File: Gannamacro.doc Created on: 2/14/2004 4:07 PM Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:48 PM 
2004] CONFLICT OF LAWS REVOLUTION 923 
relevant provisions of the leasing statute did not provide for the 
conversion of a state enterprise into a lease entity, and fur-
thermore that any succession of rights from a state enterprise 
to the lease entity would not survive the expiration of the lease 
term.”173    
In response to the defendants’ motion for reconsideration,174 
Judge Trager confessed that the Higher Court’s decision had 
undermined “certain operative premises” which supported his 
previous decision,175  but he refused to reconsider it, because the 
Higher Arbitrazh Court’s decision proved to be “clearly errone-
ous.”176  Additionally, Judge Trager found evidence on the record 
that the Higher Arbitrazh Court’s decision was “strongly influ-
enced, if not coerced, by the efforts of various Russian govern-
ment officials seeking to promote ‘state interests.’”177  In these 
circumstances, he questioned the independence of the Russian 
judiciary and affirmed his earlier ruling. 
B.  Problems of Copyright Law Revealed in Films by Jove 
Films by Jove demonstrates four problems inherent in the 
Itar-Tass approach: (1) the conflict of laws problems; (2) difficul-
ties in interpretation of foreign laws; (3) the required degree of 
deference to parallel decisions of foreign courts; (4) and the in-
ternational impact of the decision, in particular its effect on in-
ternational transactions. 
1.  Conflict of Laws Problems 
As with Itar-Tass, the facts of Films by Jove unambiguously 
pointed to Russia as the country of origin for the films.178  The 
  
 173. Id. at 174. 
 174. Id. at 159. 
 175. Id. at 191. 
 176. Id. at 205. 
 177. Id. at 216. 
 178. On the other hand, contrary to Itar-Tass, in Films by Jove, the copy-
righted works are covered by both provisions regulating the choice of law in 
international copyright: Article 14bis(2) of the Berne Convention and Section 
104A(b) of the Copyright Act because animated films at the heart of this case 
are both cinematographic works under Article 14bis(2) and restored works 
under Section 104A(b) of the Copyright Act.  According to Article 14bis(2) the 
issue of their ownership has to be controlled by the law of the protecting coun-
try, i.e. the United States.  Conversely, under Section 104A(b) the issue of 
 
File: Gannamacro.doc Created on:  2/14/2004 4:07 PM Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:48 PM 
924 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:2 
issue of initial ownership was, therefore, to be determined by 
Russian law because all the participants were Russian nation-
als and the place of origin was clearly Russia.  On the other 
hand, in contrast to Itar-Tass, Films by Jove involved transfers 
of the copyright, but the court concluded that there was no rea-
son to consider transfer of rights because the dispositive issue 
was that of ownership.179  Sometimes, it is difficult to draw a 
bright line between ownership and transfer of rights, but in a 
purely domestic transfer of rights it does not seem proper to go 
only halfway and not to use the law of the source country.180  
The transfer of copyright from Soyuzmultfilm to SMS, being a 
purely domestic transaction, cannot be meaningfully distin-
guished from the issue of initial ownership.                 
2.  Difficulties in Interpretation of Foreign Laws 
In contrast to the comparatively simple task of interpreting 
foreign copyright law in Itar-Tass, the foreign law issues in 
Films by Jove are significantly more challenging.  The Films by 
Jove court had not only to interpret the Soviet-Russian copy-
right law, but also to grapple with the messy and inconsistent 
process of privatization in Russia.181  The court successfully 
coped with its immediate task, but the increase in international 
copyright disputes will undoubtedly compel significant expendi-
  
ownership has to be controlled by the law of the source country, i.e. Russia. 
Then, the relevant question is which of these two provisions has supremacy. 
The Berne Implementation Act of 1988 amends the Copyright Act to provide 
that “[t]he provisions of the Berne Convention…shall not be enforceable in 
any action brought pursuant to the provisions of the Berne Convention itself.” 
17 U.S.C. § 104(c).  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the provision of 
the Copyright Act shall have a priority.  Evidently, the district court came to 
the same conclusion by applying the Russian law to the issue of ownership.  
 179. Films by Jove I, 154 F. Supp.2d at 477 n.42. 
 180. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 130, § 17.05(2). 
 181. Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty — U.S. Litigation in the Mirror 
of International Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 636–37 (2002) [hereinafter 
Stephan, A Becoming Modesty] (commenting that “until the introduction of 
elements of a market economy, that nation had the most of formal engage-
ments with intellectual property law generally and copyright law in particu-
lar.  Even now, more than a decade after the end of the Soviet Union, most 
copyright rules remain precatory and aspirational. Precise questions of own-
ership turn on the legitimacy of convoluted enterprise reorganizations and 
privatization transactions that took place during a period of radical legal in-
stability.”). 
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ture of judicial time on understanding and interpreting foreign 
copyright laws.  
3.  Degree of Deference to Parallel Decisions of Foreign Courts 
Another problem is the potential conflict between the United 
States courts’ interpretation of a foreign law and that of the 
source country’s court.  Discussing the Itar-Tass decision, Nim-
mer pointed out that the U.S. courts would have to decide 
whether the decisions of a foreign court of the highest level de-
served deference or, possibly, refuse to follow that court’s pro-
nouncements because they come from a civil law system, which 
lacks a system of stare decisis.182  Nimmer concluded that these 
matters remained “unaddressed in the ruling, and hence unan-
swered at present.”183  In Films by Jove, the court’s answer to 
the latter question was a refusal to follow the decisions of the 
highest court in Russia, in part because Russia does not have 
the doctrine of stare decisis, and in part because the decision of 
the court was unduly influenced by the government.184  The 
court’s rejection of the Russian judiciary’s opinion in this case is 
justified.  As Professor Stephan, who was a plaintiffs’ expert in 
Films by Jove, wrote, “it appeared that the Russian government 
had taken actions it did largely to influence the outcome of the 
U.S. case.”185  It is also obvious that the Higher Arbitrazh 
Court’s decision, subsequent to Professor Stephan’s paper, was 
instigated by the desire to influence the U.S. litigation.186  This 
evidence of undue influence on the Russian judiciary placed the 
court in a strange dilemma: it could not ignore Russian law, but 
neither could it give effect to the Russian judiciary’s tainted 
interpretation of the law.  Such disparity of interpretation of 
foreign laws is particularly troublesome because it undermines 
the policy of comity. 
  
 182. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 130, § 17.05(3). 
 183. Regarding the Itar-Tass ruling, Nimmer enumerated some of the ques-
tions concerning the issue of deference to foreign courts decisions.  For exam-
ple, “[i]s it only a decision of the highest court that deserves deference? Or 
should even that court’s pronouncements not be followed, to the extent that 
they come from a civil law system, which lacks a system of stare decisis?”  Id. 
 184. Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 205, 216. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 208–12. 
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4.  The International Impact of the Decision 
Perhaps the most important issue in international legal dis-
putes, however, remains the international impact of the deci-
sion.  In Films by Jove, the immediate impact was the plaintiff’s 
successful assertion of its distribution rights in the animated 
films against Berov’s infringement.  But this may be a limited 
victory, for it is not at all clear that the defendant FSUESMS 
can be prevented from distributing the films in other parts of 
the world.187   
Yet, paradoxically, despite these difficulties of worldwide en-
forceability, Films by Jove has broad political ramifications be-
cause it is a serious obstacle in the way of the Russian govern-
ment’s attempt to repossess the assets it lost during the period 
of privatization in Russia.  Indeed, the decision prompted a 
plethora of publications in Russia and in Russian-speaking 
communities all over the world.  Many supported the decision,188 
but some complained that an American court had robbed the 
Russian people of their cultural legacy.189  Most agreed that 
Russia’s international image had been tarnished.190  This broad 
political impact is both beneficial and detrimental.  It is detri-
mental because it could exacerbate a conflict between nations.  
But it is beneficial because it reminds governments of the im-
portance of the Rule of Law.  If a country’s own judiciary is not 
up to the task or shirks its responsibility, courts of other coun-
tries may need to step into the breach.  The U.S. judiciary need 
not sacrifice justice for the sake of comity.   
  
 187. See Zakin, Komu prinadlezhit Cheburashka?, supra note 149 (the head 
of FSUESMS publicly stating his intention to enter the international agree-
ments concerning the distribution of the animated films in disregard of the 
above decision). 
 188. See id.  Oleg Sulkin, Nekotoriye Osobennosti Natsional’nogo Piratstva 
[Some Peculiarities of National Piracy], NOVOYE RUSSKOYE SLOVO, July 19-20, 
2003, at 18; Oleg Sulkin, Mozhno li Krast’ v Gostiakh  Serebrianiye Lozhki? 
[Are You Allowed to Steal Silver Spoons?], RUSSKIY ZHURNAL, Oct. 17, 2003, 
available at http://www.russ.ru/culture/cinema/20031017_sul.html. 
 189. See Kononov, Teper’ Ya Cheburashka, supra note 149. 
 190. See Sulkin, Nekotoriye Osobennosti Natsional’nogo Piratstva, supra 
note 188; Sulkin, Mozhno li Krast’ v Gostiakh  Serebrianiye Lozhki?, supra 
note 179; Zakin, Komu prinadlezhit Cheburashka?, supra note 188. 
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V.  FROM THE ITAR-TASS APPROACH TO UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT 
A.  The Need for Uniformity in International Copyright Disputes 
The shift from the territoriality of national treatment to the 
functional approach of Itar-Tass goes a long way towards satis-
fying the need for copyright’s worldwide marketability.  The 
importance of the international marketability of copyrights, as 
previously noted, stems from the transition from an industrial 
to an information economy,191 a tendency attested to by TRIPs’ 
linkage between intellectual property and trade.192  Apart from 
TRIPs, scholars also increasingly relate copyright to property in 
general,193 as in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law’s 
principle for immovable property, on which the Itar-Tass court 
relied.  Although this tendency is criticized for not taking into 
consideration the special character of intellectual property,194 it 
satisfies an important need in the modern development of copy-
right law.  Until there is a universal copyright law protecting 
the rights of authors and guaranteeing marketability of copy-
rights worldwide, academics and judges must go on elaborating 
alternative ways of attaining these goals.  But, the obstacles 
already noted — a lack of consensus in the general choice of law 
doctrine, problems with characterization of the issues as owner-
ship or transfer of copyrights, characterization of transfers un-
der contracts or copyright law, difficulties in interpretation of 
foreign laws, the uncertainty regarding the required deference 
to foreign judgments, and effectiveness of foreign judgment en-
forcement — remain.  Most of these are amply illustrated in 
Films by Jove.  Although a universal copyright law is the ulti-
  
 191. Brennan, supra note 12, at 316. 
 192. See Guzman, International Antitrust, supra note 63, at 950. 
 193. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 113 (1990).  See also Lawrence R. Ahern, III, 
“Workouts” Under Revised Article 9: A Review of Changes and Proposal for 
Study, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 115, 131–32 (2001) (noting that Revised 
UCC Article 9 broadens the definition of accounts to include, among other 
things, “fees and royalties due from the licensing of intellectual property and 
proprietary information (such as patents, copyrights and trademarks) and fees 
from software licenses…”). 
 194. See Brennan, supra note 12, at 316 (“Trying to force fit intellectual 
property into the confines of industrial goods law is reminiscent of the ugly 
sisters of Cinderella butchering their feet to fit slippers never meant for 
them.”). 
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mate solution, that would require a consensus that is, as of yet, 
unattainable.  In the meantime, scholars have proposed various 
stop-gap ameliorations briefly noted below.  They are the mid-
dle ground between the universal and the particular.  
B.  The Compromise Between National Copyright Laws  
and the Need for Uniformity 
1.  The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Approach 
The Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of 
Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters by Professors Ro-
chelle Dreyfuss and Jane Ginsburg195 addresses the enforceabil-
ity of judgments and the need for an effective resolution of in-
ternational copyright disputes.196  It envisions the adoption of a 
convention under the auspices of the current international or-
ganizations, such as the WIPO or WTO.197  Such a convention 
would be open to countries that are members of TRIPs and 
would cover approximately the same scope of rights.198  It would 
also contain the elaboration of the rules of cooperation among 
courts in the cases of parallel litigation,199 solidification of 
claims,200 and choice of law rules.201  Although this approach 
solves many problems of international copyright litigation, its 
success depends on its formal adoption or accession by states, 
which is anathema to the jealously cherished freedom of sover-
eign states to determine their own copyright policy.  In this re-
spect, TRIPs may be the high water mark for years to come.202  
  
 195. See generally Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 25.  
 196. Id. at 1065. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. at 1068. 
 199. Id. at 1069–71. 
 200. Id. at 1071. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Many scholars point out the internal conflict between developing and 
developed countries embodied in TRIPs and its threat to enforceability.  See 
J.H. Reichman & Pamela Sanderson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 
VAND. L. REV. 51, 97 (1997) (commenting that “[u]niversal intellectual prop-
erty standards embodied in the TRIPs Agreement became enforceable within 
the framework of a World Trade Organization, largely as the result of sus-
tained pressures by a coalition of powerful manufacturing associations in 
Europe, the United States, and Japan.”); Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum 
Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can 
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In the case of parallel litigation, the success of the proposal will 
depend on unprecedented cooperation among various national 
courts.  As amply shown in Films by Jove, it is not realistic to 
expect U.S. courts to defer to the decisions of Russian courts in 
a case where the strong interests of an American plaintiff are 
involved and the defendant is also an American company.  It is 
equally unrealistic to expect a Russian court to defer to a U.S. 
court’s interpretation of Russian law.  Consequently, although 
the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg model boldly tackles many of the diffi-
culties encountered in international copyright disputes, its re-
alization is by no means certain. 
2.  The Graeme Dinwoodie Approach 
In contrast to the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg model’s concentration 
on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments, Professor 
Graeme Dinwoodie’s approach is directed at substantive is-
sues.203  Instead of applying the variegated copyright law of dif-
ferent countries, “the substantive method suggests that the 
court develop a solution that accommodates more than one in-
terest.”204  Dinwoodie noted that “[w]hen compared with the tra-
ditional negotiation of treaties, national court’s development of 
‘international law’ is more responsive to social conditions and 
hence more dynamic.”205  He does acknowledge that his ap-
proach can be criticized for lack of certainty.  His response is 
that “in the long term some ex ante uncertainty might be worth 
the gains in terms of aptness and legal rules.”206  Nevertheless, 
it seems inevitable that a court’s process of weighing the inter-
ests and trying to accommodate more than one would lead to an 
intolerable amount of uncertainty, confusion and inconsistency.  
Indeed, it is not clear how the substantive approach of Professor 
  
Learn From Mediators, Business Strategists, and International Relations 
Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 581 (2002) (noting that although TRIPs suc-
ceeds in providing higher standards for the protection of intellectual property,  
“it masks the significant cultural and ideological differences between devel-
oped and less developed countries…”).  
 203. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the Interna-
tional Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 993 (2002) [herein-
after Dinwoodie, The Architecture]. 
 204. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order, supra note 26, at 564. 
 205. Dinwoodie, The Architecture, supra note 203, at 1011. 
 206. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order, supra note 26, at 572. 
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Dinwoodie could ever resolve the dispute in a case like Films by 
Jove. 
3.  A Supranational Body of Principles of Equity 
a.  Foundation 
As mentioned at the outset, this Note suggests that the most 
promising approach is the supplementation of the above amelio-
rative proposals by a supranational body of equitable principles.  
This body of principles does not amount to universal copyright 
law; rather, it is a measured safeguard against some of the 
dangers associated with the process of balancing conflicting in-
terests and policies.  One commentator suggests the idea of a 
“global justice-constituency” which will need, first, to “articulate 
what the public purpose [of copyright] is at the global level, in-
stead of simply transporting ready-made purposes and rules 
from national jurisdictions”207 and, second, to “formulate rules, 
norms, and concepts that are carefully calibrated to achieve 
that public purpose.”208  Such a body of laws can serve as a solid 
foundation for the development of universal copyright law and 
also help solve some difficult situations when policies of several 
foreign states are deadlocked in a particular copyright dispute.  
In a somewhat similar vein, this Note suggests the elabora-
tion of a supranational body of equitable norms, which will help 
to ensure justice in international disputes when the conflict of 
law doctrine does not give a clear indication as to what interest 
should prevail, or when that indication egregiously contradicts 
the general principles of fairness and justice.  This approach is 
supported by Andrew Guzman’s idea that the purpose of choice 
of law rules is to increase global welfare — as opposed to the 
traditional approach of simply protecting “governmental inter-
est.”209  Equitable principles such as those of promissory estop-
pel, protection of a good faith purchaser, and apparent agency 
should be included in this supranational body of law.  Some of 
them are, indeed, present in the national laws of many foreign 
  
 207. Murumba, supra note 8, at 459. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Guzman, Choice of Law, supra note 1, at 49. 
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countries.210  The goal of solidifying them into a robust suprana-
tional body of equitable norms is not unattainable.  It can be 
done through both international regulation as well as private 
adjudication.  Some hail formal regulation, such as that sig-
naled by the spectacular success of Berne and TRIPs.  Others, 
however, may see private adjudication as more promising on 
the view that courts are more dynamic than public interna-
tional law-making.211  Through adjudication norms can be elabo-
rated in the course of judicial dialogue, during which courts 
“will be hammering out both doctrinal solutions and direct rela-
tionships to manage the increasingly complex job of multi-
jurisdictional dispute resolution.”212  This Note argues that regu-
lation and private adjudication complement each other, just like 
their product, supranational equitable norms, complements the 
ameliorative Dreyfuss-Ginsburg and Dinwoodie models. 
b.  Application of Equitable Principles to Films by Jove 
i.  Theory of Apparent Authority 
The common law doctrine of apparent authority is a well-
settled principle of the law of agency which “exists to protect 
third parties who are misled by appearances.”213  According to 
the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958), “apparent authority 
to do an act is created as to a third person by written or spoken 
word or any other conduct of the principal which, reasonably 
interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the principal 
consents to have the act done on his behalf by the person pur-
  
 210. See generally H.L.E. VERHAGEN, AGENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1995); Wolfram Müller-Freienfels, Legal Relations in the Law of Agency: 
Power of Agency and Commercial Certainty, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 193 (1964); 
Larry A. DiMatteo, Recent Development: Contract Talk: Reviewing the Histori-
cal and Practical Significance of the Principles of European Contract Law, 43 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 569 (2002).  See also Wendell H. Holmes & Symeon C. Syme-
onides, Representation, Mandate, and Agency: A Kommentar on Louisiana’s 
New Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1087 (1999) (discussing the inclusion of equitable 
norms in Louisiana’s revised code).  
 211. See Dinwoodie, The Architecture, supra note 203, at 1011. 
 212. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 
1124 (2000). 
 213. DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: EXAMPLES AND 
EXPLANATIONS 26 (1995). 
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porting to act for him.”214  It is important to note that apparent 
authority to bind the principal can exist even when there is no 
actual agency.215  Apparent authority is a synthesis of two sepa-
rate policies underlying the doctrine: the first holds that, be-
tween two innocent parties, the loss should be placed on the 
party who could have more easily avoided the confusion; and 
the second is the protection of the normal commercial opera-
tions.216  Because of these important policies, the doctrine of ap-
parent authority is widely applied in various spheres of U.S. 
law.217  
The versatility of the doctrine of apparent authority can be il-
lustrated by its application to the facts of Films by Jove.  As 
their alternative theory, the Plaintiffs in that case advanced the 
argument that the Russian government either “induced [Films 
by Jove, Inc.’s] reasonable reliance by cloaking the lease enter-
prise with apparent authority to license the Soyuzmultfilm 
Studio copyrights; or had the effect of ratifying…the licensing 
agreement after it was executed.”218  The facts of the case leave 
no doubt that the plaintiff Films by Jove, Inc., had every reason 
to believe that SMS was the true owner of copyrights given to it 
  
 214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958). 
 215. KLEINBERGER, supra note 213, at 27. 
 216. Id. at 36. 
 217. See, e.g., Nancy R. Furnari, Comment: Are Traditional Agency Princi-
ples Effective for Internet Transactions, Given the Lack of Personal Interac-
tion?, 63 ALB. L. REV. 537 (1999) (discussing the role of apparent authority in 
consumer protection for internet transactions); Rachael E. Schwartz, “And 
Tomorrow?” The Torture Victim Protection Act,  11 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
271 (1994) (Torture Victim Protection Act); John W. Larson, Florida’s New 
Partnership Law: The Revised Uniform Partnership Act and Limited Liability 
Partnerships, 23 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 201 (1995) (laws of partnership); Robert 
Emerson, Franchisors’ Liability When Franchisees are Apparent Agents: An 
Empirical and Policy Analysis of “Common Knowledge” About Franchising, 20 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 609 (1992) (franchisors’ liability); Frank Partnoy, The Shift-
ing Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 421, 
470-472 (2001).  See also Meeting of OAS-CIDIP-VI Drafting Committee on 
Secured Transactions Conference Transcript Day Three: XI. Electronic Com-
merce Aspects of Secured Transactions, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 491 (2001) 
(securities); Jeffrey A. Parness & Austin W. Bartlett, Unsettling Questions 
Regarding Lawyer’s Civil Claim Settlement Authority, 78 OR. L. REV. 1061 
(1999); Jeffrey A. Parness & Austin W. Bartlett, The Authority of Illinois 
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CHI. L.J. 199, 220–21 (2000) (lawyers’ civil claim settlement authority).   
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by the Russian state.  The plaintiff’s reliance was both reason-
able in the circumstances, and it was caused by numerous acts 
and omissions of the Russian government, such as the letter of 
September 16, 1992, sent to SMS by a state official confirming 
SMS’s worldwide distribution rights in the films;219 the January 
22, 1997 document from the Russian State Taxation Auditors, 
which “specifically references the lease enterprise’s 1992 
agreement with [Films by Jove, Inc.], indicating that the lease 
enterprise paid taxes on the proceeds received from [Films by 
Jove, Inc.];220 and the two licensing agreements between SMS 
and state-owned Russian television studios.”221  Although the 
state was fully aware of the licensing agreement between SMS 
and Films by Jove, Inc., it did not claim copyrights or challenge 
the agreement.  On the contrary, by its letter of September 16, 
1992 the government actually represented to Films by Jove, Inc. 
that the license agreement was valid.  Elementary notions of 
justice and fairness do not leave any doubt that the plaintiff 
who relied, in good faith, on the state’s acts and omissions 
should prevail.  Under the law of agency in the United States, 
therefore, the plaintiffs should, and would be likely to, win their 
case. 
ii.  Conflict of Laws Issues 
However, there remains the issue of determining which coun-
try’s substantive law should be applied to the problem of agency 
and the equities of the case.  It is reasonable to conclude that 
Russian law should apply because both the agent and the prin-
ciple were in Russia.  Unfortunately, the principle of equity in 
Russian law is even less developed than Russian copyright 
law.222  Consequently, the very same problems we encountered 
earlier — interpreting foreign law, the degree of deference to 
the foreign court judgments, and the threat of pervasive incen-
tive to a court of a foreign country to distort its interpretation of 
  
 219. Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 214. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 215. 
 222. See generally ANDREYEV, PREDSTAVITEL’STVO V GRAZHDANSOM PRAVE 
[Representation in Civil Code] (1978); Kuz’mishin A., Klassifikatziya Predsta-
vitel’stva i Polnomochiya v Grazhdanskom Prave [Classification of Represen-
tation and Mandate in Civil Code], 8 KHOZIAYSTVO I PRAVO 27–36 (2000). 
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the law in order to influence the outcome of the international 
dispute — are still with us. 
On the other hand, it seems improper in these circumstances 
for an American court to apply the American law of equity to 
the assignment of rights in Films by Jove.  Although there is no 
clear answer to this question in the international choice of law 
doctrine,223 most of the existing approaches seem to disapprove 
it.   
The approach most widely adhered to is lex loci actus.224  Ac-
cording to this approach, the law of the place where the agent 
acts determines the issues of agency.  It is argued that the pur-
pose of this approach is to protect commercial intercourse, in 
particular a third party’s position, because it requires the third 
party to consult only the law of the country where the agent 
acts.225  However, lex loci actus is variously interpreted to mean 
the law of the country where the agent really commits his acts, 
the law of the country where the agent has to act according to 
his agreement with the principal, the law of the country where 
the agent has his place of business, or the law of the country 
that governs the contract between the agent and the third 
party.226  When applied to Films by Jove, all these interpreta-
tions, except the last one, point to the use of Russian law.227  In-
deed, even the last one does not unequivocally point to Ameri-
can law: although it is true that the contract between SMS and 
Films by Jove, Inc. contained a choice of law clause stipulating 
that the law of California apply to issues arising under the con-
tract,228 it is doubtful that, under the apparent authority argu-
  
 223. In a recently decided case, the New York Court of Appeals found 
American Law, rather than Russian law, controlling the issue of the contract 
validity and apparent authority because of the choice of law clause in the con-
tract and New York’s significant ties.  Indosuez Int’l Fin. B.V. v. Nat’l Reserve 
Bank, 98 N.Y.2d 238 (2002). 
 224. VERHAGEN, supra note 210, at 73. 
 225. Id. at 74. 
 226. VERHAGEN, supra note 210, at 75. 
 227. Section 292(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws also 
clearly points to Russian law stating that the principle will be bound “under 
the local law of the state where the agent dealt with the third person, pro-
vided at least that the principle had authorized the agent to act on his behalf 
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has such authority.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 292(2). 
 228. Films by Jove II, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 215. 
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ment, Russia as the principal should be bound by California law 
by dint of this choice of law clause.  
Moreover, the choice of law rules in the law of equity do not 
always protect the third party to the transaction, nor do they 
have the virtues of certainty and predictability.  This is  be-
cause of different local laws and the difficulties embedded in the 
modern choice of law doctrine already noted herein.  So, the 
combination of local equitable protection with conflict of laws 
rules does not really resolve the problem.  The suggested solu-
tion lies in a particular construction of the equitable principles 
which sidesteps many of the difficulties just mentioned.  
c.  Supranational Norms of Equity as the Safe-Guards in  
International Copyright 
This Note proposes the idea of a supranational body of equi-
table principles as the solution to obvious distortions encoun-
tered in the processes of resolving disputes by a straight balanc-
ing of conflicting interests in the interest of justice.  Many coun-
tries already have the principles of equity mentioned in their 
laws, though the level of protection can vary and some states 
may not have every principle found in others.229  Nevertheless, it 
seems that uniform norms of equity protecting commerce are 
much easier for nations to accept than drastic changes in na-
tional copyright laws.  Supranational equitable principles are, 
therefore, a more viable avenue for correcting the grossly unjust 
outcomes that conflicts in international copyright laws would 
countenance.  
In a case like Films by Jove, a supranational body of equita-
ble principles could be relied on to protect the plaintiff from the 
skewed decisions of Russian Arbitrazh courts of different levels.  
Supranational equitable principles would help to balance the 
interests of the parties and avoid direct conflicts with other 
countries’ laws.  Under this approach, U.S. courts would not 
have to argue with the Russian judiciary over whether, under 
Russian law, the ownership of the copyrights belonged, or not, 
to SMS at the moment of its licensing agreement with Films by 
  
 229. See Symposium, Responding to the Obstacles to Electronic Commerce 
in Latin America: General Questionnaire, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 23, 43–
49 (2000); Meeting of OAS-CIDIP-VI, supra note 217, at 558–64. 
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Jove.  It would be sufficient to say that, under international 
principles of equity, acts and omissions of the Russian govern-
ment clothed SMS with apparent authority to give worldwide 
distribution rights to Films by Jove, and directed the latter’s 
reasonable reliance.  The Russian government would be pre-
cluded from interfering with Films by Jove, Inc.’s exercise of its 
rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The body of supranational equitable principles, including ap-
parent authority, should be developed to serve as safeguards for 
the serious problems inherent in the straight functional ap-
proach to conflict of laws adopted in Itar-Tass.  Though supra-
national equitable principles are uniform (as their name im-
plies), these equitable principles are more palatable because 
they do not rise to the level of universal copyright law, and be-
cause they already exist in the major legal systems of the world. 
They are not the lightning rod that a fully-fledged copyright law 
might be; yet they provide more or less the same benefits: 
smoother international copyright commerce.  Their reach is not 
greater than their grasp, nor is it less than what is realistically 
attainable.  They are the ideal interim measure while consensus 
builds for a universal copyright law, and may, indeed, contrib-
ute to the attainment of that happy but still elusive end.  
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